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Financial Architecture and Economic Performance: International 
Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
The paper examines the relations between the architecture of an economy’s financial 
system – its degree of market orientation – and economic performance in the real sector. 
We argue that the relative effectiveness of bank-based versus market-based financial 
systems depends on the strength of the contractual environment and the extent of agency 
problems in the economy. We find that while market-based systems outperform bank-
based systems among countries with developed financial sectors, bank-based systems 
fare better among countries with underdeveloped financial sectors.  Countries dominated 
by small firms grow faster in bank-based systems and those dominated by larger firms in 
market-based systems. The findings suggest that recent trends in financial development 
policies that indiscriminately prescribe market-oriented financial-system-architecture to 
emerging and transition economies might be misguided because suitable financial 
architecture, in and of itself, could be a source of value. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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I.  Introduction 
 
An important long-standing issue in corporate finance has been the relative merits 
of banks and financial markets as providers of capital.  A macro-economic version of this 
question is whether the financial architecture of an economy – i.e. the degree to which its 
financial system is bank-oriented or market-based – has any impact on economic 
performance in the real sector.  Does a financial architecture anchored on markets work 
better than one centered on banks, and if so, under what conditions?   
The theoretical literature is sparse in its predictions whereby lacking a unified 
approach, different theories emphasize specific features of banks and markets.   Opinions 
range from the position that financial architecture has no real consequences to arguments 
emphasizing the inherent superiority of either market-based or bank-based systems.   A 
middle ground position is to argue that the effectiveness of a particular architecture 
depends on a host of country specific factors.  These may include the contractual 
environment of the country (e.g. Rajan and Zingales (1998b)), the informational structure 
of participating firms (e.g. Boot and Thakor (1997)), or the technological characteristics 
of the economy (Allen and Gale (1999b), Rajan and Zingales (1998b)). 
In this paper, we use industry-level data from a panel of thirty-six countries to 
examine how a country’s financial architecture affects performance in the real sector of 
the economy.  We argue that the relative effectiveness of a given architecture depends on 
the level of development of the financial sector, the latter being a reflection of the 
supporting legal and institutional environment, and the prevalence and severity of agency 
problems in the economy.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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We find that financial architecture is not a matter of indifference in that real 
economic performance varies systematically across economies with differing financial  
system architecture.  Across countries with underdeveloped financial sectors, industries 
from bank based economies grow faster than industries from market based systems, while 
industries in market-based systems grow faster across countries with developed financial 
systems.   That is market-based financial systems significantly outperform bank-based 
systems across countries with developed financial sectors.  Bank-based financial systems 
significantly outperform market-based systems across countries with underdeveloped 
financial sectors.  Put differently, the degree of market orientation of the financial system 
is significantly positively related to economic performance in countries with developed 
financial sectors, whereas this relation is significantly negative in countries with 
underdeveloped financial sectors.  
We also find that bank-based financial architecture outperforms market-based 
systems across countries dominated by small firms while market-based architecture fares 
well across countries populated with larger firms.  Using the cross-country variation in 
the average firm size as a proxy for the variations in severity of agency problems, the 
finding appears to be consistent with the agency perspective to financial architecture that 
bank-based systems could be superior in situations of rampant moral hazard problem that 
needs close monitoring at which banks have a natural comparative advantage.  This is 
also consistent with observations that, even in advanced countries, small firms rely on 
bank financing more so than on markets.  Peterson and Rajan (1995) further document 
that, in the U.S., small firms secure better credit terms and access to capital in  
concentrated banking environment than in competitive banking.    Nonetheless, Kumar, 
Rajan and Zingales(1999) report  that financial development is key determinant of firm William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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size across countries. Hence, given this partial endogeniety of firm size and financial 
development, it might be difficult to isolate the impacts of severity of agency problems 
from that of the strength of the contractual environment.   
The findings indicate that financial architecture, in and of itself, could be a source 
of value.  A lack of fit between the financial architecture, and the legal and institutional 
preconditions could retard economic performance.   A market-oriented financial system 
does not fit well with an environment of weak contractability and lack of respect to the 
law.  On the other hand, a synergic fit between the financial architecture and the 
contractual environment fosters economic growth. 
The results suggest that the recent trend in policy-making circles of prescribing  
market-based systems indiscriminately across emerging and transition economies might 
be misguided.   Markets require requisite institutional and legal infrastructure.  In 
situations where strong contractual environment is lacking, as in many emerging and 
transition economies, there is more economic value in strengthening the banking sector.   
The key feature of relationship-based financial systems is the relative lack of competition 
and transparency, potentially causing inefficient investment and financing decisions as 
there would be a lack of external price signals to guide decisions.  On the other hand, 
relationship-based finance has an important advantage of being flexible in 
accommodating firms with short-term difficulties that have otherwise long term prospect.   
Established relationships enable creditors to benefit from future successes, as well  
as ‘dynamically cross-subsidize’ younger, potentially profitable firms with short term 
financial difficulty from mature firms that have the ability to pay.   
A growing literature underscores the importance of financial sector development 
to economic growth.  Levine and Zervos(1998),  Rajan and Zingales(1998a), and William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) explore the impact of financial development on 
economic growth at country, industry and firm levels respectively.   While recognizing 
the importance of overall financial development, others stress the role of financial system 
design in impacting the mode of financing, governance and ultimately the performance of 
the real economy (see Allen (1999a) for an extensive discussion of this literature).   
The paper is related to recent theoretical literature comparing bank-based 
financial system architecture with market based financial systems (Allen and Gale 
(1999a), Rajan and Zingales (1998b) and Boot and Thakor (1997)).  Rajan and Zingales 
(1998b) emphasize the strength of the contractual environment as determinant of the 
effectiveness of market based versus bank based systems.  Boot and Thakor (1997) 
underscores the importance of particular agency problems in the economy as dictating the 
relative merits of one architecture over another.   They conjuncture that bank based 
systems add value to economies where post-lending moral hazard is a dominant problem.    
Allen and Gale (1998) emphasizes the value of information aggregation provided in 
market oriented systems for economies where decision environments are more complex 
as in industries with frequent technological change.  Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) 
provide evidence of relations between the legal environment and financial architecture.   
Common law countries and countries with strong protection of minority shareholders 
tend to have market-based systems  
This paper examines the differential impacts of the market orientation of the 
financial system (i.e. financial architecture) across countries of different contractual 
environments.  It also assesses the role of agency problems on the relative merits of the 
two architectures by exploring country characteristics, such as typical size of firms, as William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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proxies for the severity of agency problems. In so doing, the paper sheds light on the on-
going debate on the relative merits of market-based versus relationship finance.   
The paper is related to Levine (2000) and Beck and Levine (2000).   In a cross-
country study, Levine (2000) examines the impact of financial architecture on economic 
performance, in particular on per capita GDP growth and its sources.  Beck and Levine 
(2000) examine whether growth rates of industries that differ in external financial 
dependence depend on countries’ financial architecture.  Both Levine (2000) and Beck 
and Levine(2000) identify overall financial development and not financial system 
architecture as key determinant of growth.   The main difference between our study and 
the two is our emphasis on differences in contractual environments across countries and 
differential degree and prevalence of agency problems to identify the comparative 
advantages of financial system architectures.  
The balance of the paper is as follows.  Section II presents the theoretical 
arguments on the merits of the two forms of financial architecture and develops  
testable hypotheses.  Section III introduces the data and the empirical methodology.  
Section IV discusses the results and Section V concludes. 
 
II.  Financial Architecture and Performance: Theory 
 
  Markets as well as banks perform vital functions in an economy, which include 
capital formation, facilitation of risk sharing, information production and monitoring.    
The case for bank-based or market-oriented systems could be made based on the relative 
effectiveness with which banks or markets execute these common functions. The 
literature on the merits of banks versus markets is extensive and is outside the scope of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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this paper.   At the extreme, some argue that market-based systems are inherently 
superior (see Macey (1998) and the recent literature on global convergence of corporate  
governance (e.g. Coffee (1999)) while others underscore the intrinsic value of banks (e.g. 
Gilson and Roe (1993)).  By implication, adopting the superior financial architecture 
would enhance economic performance. 
  There are also middle-ground positions on the role of financial architecture.  
Some argue that financial architecture is inconsequential to the real sector with the belief 
that banks and markets are complementary in providing financial services, and that 
neither has a natural advantage in the provision of all services.  Others argue that 
financial system architecture matters in that markets or banks may have a comparative 
advantage in delivering particular services depending on the economic and contractual 
environments of the country.  
 
   A.  Financial Architecture as a Matter of Indifference 
  The indifference view which is partly based on the functional perspective to 
financial systems, stresses that a financial system provides bundles of services such as 
project evaluation, risk sharing, information production and monitoring.  It is the quantity  
and quality of these services in an economy that matters, and not the venue by which they 
are provided (see Levine (2000) for an extensive review of this perspective).   Hence, the 
market orientation of the financial system is of secondary importance, since both banks 
and markets provide both common and complementary services.  This view has recently 
received more strength from the law and finance literature which stresses the importance 
of investor-protecting legal codes and their enforcement in enhancing financial services 
that promote economic performance (Laporta et al (1997, 1998, 1999), see also Levine William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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(2000)).  La porta et al (1999) suggests that differences in depth and quality of financial 
systems as predicted by the quality of the supporting legal system is more important than 
distinctions in terms of bank or market orientation. 
 
  B.  Financial Architecture Relevance  
  The perspective that holds that financial architecture matters rely on distinct 
differences in the types of services provided by markets and banks.  A key attribute of 
financial markets - a feature that distinguishes them from banks - is that equilibrium 
prices formed in markets provide valuable information (about the prospect of investment 
opportunities) to real decisions of firms which, in turn, affect market prices.  This is what 
is called the ‘information feedback’ function of markets.  Tadesse (2000) provides 
empirical evidence that this market-based governance has a positive impact on economic 
performance.  In particular, it has an effect of enhancing economic efficiency. 
  The relative importance of a given financial architecture (market vs banks) 
depends on the value of this market information (demand side argument) and how  
effectively markets perform this information aggregation function  (supply side 
argument).     
  On the supply side, the relative merits of markets versus banks depend on the 
effectiveness with which markets can perform their information feedback function.  Well 
functioning markets rely on contracts and their legal enforceability.  Impediments to 
markets such as weak contractability reduce the supply of information aggregation as a 
market function.  In this situation, a bank-based architecture, which survives in weak 
contractual environments, could be of superior value.  Rajan and Zingales (1998b) 
postulates that the relative merits of the financial architectures are a function of the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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contractability of the environment and the relative value of price signals.  Bank based 
systems naturally fits in situations with low contractability combined with high capital 
scarcity relative to investment opportunity.  Market –based systems work better in 
situations of high contractability and high capital availability relative to investment 
opportunities (implying high value of price signals) 
  On the demand side, one would expect a revival of market-based systems in 
situations where information aggregation is especially valued.  However, market 
generated information is not always considered useful for various reasons.  First, not all 
decision environments benefit from price signaling.   Allen (1993) and Allen and Gale  
(1999b) argue that the information feedback from markets would be most valuable in 
decision environments, such as new industries, in which consensus are hard to achieve 
about the optimal managerial rule due to rapid technological change, and constantly  
changing market conditions.  Conversely, the value of information aggregation is lower 
in economies that are dominated by firms with less complex decision environments. 
  Second, the prevalence and severity of moral hazard attenuates the value of 
information feedback by financial markets.   Boot and Thakor (1997) argue that banks 
provide a superior resolution of post-lending moral hazard resulting from potential 
distortions in firms’ investment choices while markets provide improvements in real 
decisions through the information aggregation.   However, the greater the moral hazard 
problem, the lower is information acquisition in the financial markets, and the smaller the 
value of market information in affecting real decisions.  The value of market information 
is, therefore, lower in economies dominated by firms that are prone to moral hazard 
problems (e.g. poor credit reputations).  This implies that, other things constant, a bank-William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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based system might fit better to economies dominated by firms prone to more agency 
problems.  
  Third, the value of price signals also depends on the ease with which project 
selection could be accomplished in its absence.   The value of price discovery is higher in 
situations where real decisions could be least likely distorted if not based on external 
information.  Rajan and Zingles (1998b) points that in situations of extreme capital 
scarcity relative to available investment opportunities, real decisions, even in the absence 
of market information, are less likely to go wrong because, in this case, it would be 
relatively clear as to which investment would be profitable.  Hence, all other things 
constant, the more capital abundance relative to investment opportunities in an economy,  
the higher is the value of information aggregation, and the more desirable a market-based 
architecture; and vice versa.   
  The foregoing implies that the real consequences of financial architecture 
(market-based vs bank-based) should depend on a host of country specific factors 
including the contractual environment of the economy, the associated severity of agency 
problems, and the degree of complexity of the decision environment in the economy.  In 
the sections that follow, we examine empirically the real consequences of financial 
architecture across economies of differing contractual environments and differing 
prevalence of agency problems.  We expect market-based architectures to perform better 
in countries with stronger contractual environment, and bank-based systems to fare well 
in contractually weak economies.  This is what we call the contractual view to financial 
architecture.  We expect bank-based systems to perform better in economies with firms 
that are observationally more prone to agency problems; and market based systems to William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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fare better in countries with firms that are less susceptible to these problems.  This is the 
agency view to financial architecture. 
   
III.  Data and Methodology 
 
Our database combines international data on financial architecture and on 
financial development, industry level data on economic performance, and various 
measures of the legal and institutional environments of countries.  We have complete data 
on these sets of variables for thirty-six countries.   We have data on financial architecture 
and financial development for a large cross-section of countries, but industry 
performance data only for a matching 36 countries, thus limiting the size of our sample. 
 
A.  Financial Architecture 
There is a lack of uniformly accepted empirical definition of whether a given 
country’s financial system is market-based or bank-based.  Previous studies use stylized 
facts based on a handful of countries, such as Germany as representation of bank-based 
system and the U.S. as a prototype of market-based system.  We use a variety of financial 
architecture indicators based on aggregate cross-country data recently compiled at the 
World Bank.  The data set described in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (1999) 
contains measures of the relative size, activity, and efficiency of the banking and market  
sub-sectors of the financial system for a broad cross-section of countries over the period 
1980 to 1995 which also coincides with the period for which we have data on economic 
performance.   For this study, we use two measures of financial architecture as described 
in Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999): ARCHITECTURE, a continuous variable, and William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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MARKET, a dummy variable that distinguishes market-based countries from bank-based 
systems.   The definitions of these variables as described in Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine(1999) are as follows: 
Architecture:  Architecture is an index of the degree of stock market orientation of 
a financial system and is based on three indices of financial architecture based on 
measures of relative size, activity and efficiency of the stock market in a given country 
vis a vis those of the banking sector.   Higher values of this index indicate a more market- 
Oriented financial system.   The variable ARCHITECTURE reflects the means-removed 
averages of three variables: architecture-size, architecture-activity and architecture-
efficiency. 
 Architecture-Size:  Architecture- Size measures the relative size of stock markets 
to that of banks in the financial system.  The size of domestic stock market is measured 
by market capitalization of domestic stocks to GDP ratio.  The size of the banking sector 
is measured by the bank credit ratio defined as the claims of the banking sector against 
the private sector as a percentage of GDP.  This excludes claims of non-bank 
intermediaries, and credit to the public sector. Architecture-Size combines the two size  
measures as a ratio of the capitalization ratio to bank credit ratio.  Larger values indicate 
more market orientation. 
Architecture-Activity:  measures the activity of stock markets relative to that of 
banks, and is denoted by the ratio of total value of stocks traded to bank credit ratio.   
Total value traded as a share of GDP measures stock market activity relative to economic 
activity, and bank credit ratio (defined above) also indicate the importance of banks in the 
economic activities of the private sector. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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Architecture-Efficiency: measures the relative efficiency of a country’s stock 
markets vis a vis that of its banks.  Efficiency of stock markets is measured by the total 
value traded ratio defined to be the share of total value of shares traded to GDP.  
Efficiency of banking is measured by overhead costs defined to be the ratio of banking 
overhead costs to banking assets.  Architecture-Efficiency is the product of total value  
traded ratio and overhead costs. Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (1999) also present 
measures using turnover ratio (instead of value traded) and find no different rankings. 
ARCHITECTURE, the conglomerate measure, takes, after removing the means of 
each series, the average of capitalization to bank credit ratio, value traded to bank credit 
ratio, and the product of value traded and overhead costs.  For robustness, we also  
develop an alternative aggregation of the architecture variables.   We generate a 
conglomerate measure as a principal component of the three architecture variables. 
Market:  MARKET, our alternative measure, is a dummy variable and classifies 
countries as market-based if they fall above the mean of the ARCHITECTURE, the 
conglomerate index, and as bank- based if they score below the mean of the index.  
Table 1 presents country classifications based on financial architecture and 
financial development (discussed below).  The top two panels list countries with market-
based financial architecture and the bottom two provide a list of bank-based systems.    
The average of the ARCHITECTURE variable for the market-based countries is 0.866 
and that for bank based countries is –0.38141.   The difference is statistically significant 
at 1 percent.  This is true comparing market-based economies and bank-based economies 
across underdeveloped countries (0.5300 against –0.40889), as well as across developed 
economies (1.09 against –0.3608).  
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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B.  Financial Development 
To control for the overall development of the financial systems, we classify 
countries into financially developed and financially underdeveloped based on two 
indices.  Following Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999), we define a country as having 
underdeveloped financial system if it scores below the mean on both bank development 
and stock market development.  Specifically, an underdeveloped financial system will 
have (1) lower than the mean for Bank-Credit ratio, and (2) lower than the mean for value 
traded ratio (i.e. value traded to GDP ratio).   
We use this classification as a proxy for the differing contractual environment 
across groups of countries.  La porta et al (1997) reports that capital market development 
is primarily dictated by legal protection and accompanying enforcement afforded by the 
countries’ legal system.   Specifically, countries with strong contractual environment, as 
reflected in the breadth of investor protecting legal provisions and strong enforcement of 
the laws, tend to have well developed securities markets.  We use, therefore, the financial 
development classification as a proxy for differences in contractual environments. 
Table 1 provides the classification of countries by financial development.  
Countries on the left two panels are countries with under-developed financial sectors, and 
those on the right two panels are countries with developed financial systems.  In this 
classification, Denmark is considered financially underdeveloped because it registers 
below the average on bank development and stock market development
1.  Measures of 
bank and stock market development are significantly higher in financially developed 
countries than in underdeveloped countries.  The average bank ratio for developed 
                                                           
1 The forgoing analysis is robust to classifying Denmark as financially developed or removing it altogether. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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countries is 0.728 versus 0.255 for underdeveloped countries; stock value traded to GDP 
ratio is 0.327 in developed countries versus 0.072 in underdeveloped countries.   
 
C.  Economic Performance 
We use industry level data obtained from the United Nations Industrial Database 
to construct economic performance measures.  The database contains data on the 
production and cost structure of manufacturing industries for the sample of countries.   
We use data on ten representative manufacturing industries.  The economic performance 
measures include annual growth in industry real value added, growth in productivity and 
growth in production and economic efficiency.   Real value-added is gross output less 
intermediate inputs, all stated in real terms.   
Growth in value added could be a result of growth in factors of production and 
improvements in productivity.  Productivity improvements, in turn, can be decomposed 
into growth in the efficiency with which resources are utilized given the technology of 
the firm, and technological change which reflects improvements in the products and 
processes.  Efficiency improvements are measured in reference to cross country 
production (and cost) functions as representations of the best practice technology.  
Production efficiency is a measure of how closer an industry becomes to the best practice 
production frontier in its production structure.   Economic efficiency is how closer an 
industry gets to the best-practice cost frontier in its cost structure.  These measures are 
obtained from Tadesse (2000) which presents details on their construction.   
   Table 1 provides a summary of these performance measures for each country in 
the sample and summaries for the sub-sample of countries.  Table 2 provides a simple 
comparison of performance between market-based and bank-based systems without William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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making distinction based on contractual environment or firm size.  For the full sample, 
there is no discernable difference in economic performance (for any of the performance 
measures) between bank-based countries and market-based economies.   The same is true 
between financially developed countries and financially underdeveloped countries (see 
Table 2).   Notice in Table 1, however, the differences in economic performance between 
market-based (top two panels) and bank-based economies (bottom two panels) for the  
developed (right two panels) and underdeveloped (left two panels) sub sample 
respectively.  On each performance measure, the average economic performance of bank-
based countries is significantly higher than that of market based countries in financially 
underdeveloped sub-sample.  For example, growth in value added (0.0665 against 0.009), 
growth in production efficiency (0.002 versus -0.0006) and growth in economic 
efficiency (-0.007 versus -0.1597). The reverse is true (i.e. economic performance is 
better in market-based economies than in bank-based economies) among the countries 
that have developed financial systems. 
 
IV. Results 
A.  Financial Architecture, Contractual Environment and Economic 
Performance 
 
  As a preliminary step to gauge the relations between financial architecture and 
performance, we begin with a difference in means tests of economic performance 
between market-based systems and bank based systems.  Table 3 groups countries into 
those with underdeveloped and those with developed financial systems.  Within each 
group, we then compare economic performance measures between countries of market-
based architecture and those with bank-based systems.   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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    Across countries with developed financial systems, economic performance is 
significantly larger in countries with market-based financial architecture than in those 
with bank-based architecture.  Conversely, across countries with underdeveloped  
financial systems, economic performance is significantly larger in countries with bank-
based systems than in those with market-based architecture.  This is true nearly for all 
measures of economic performance.  For example, the average realized real growth rate  
in value added for market-based, financially well developed countries, 3.7%, is 
statistically larger than that for bank-based financially well-developed countries (0.8%).  
On the other hand, growth rate in value added for bank-based, financially underdeveloped 
countries, 6.3%, statistically dominates that for bank-based, financially underdeveloped 
countries, 0.5%.  Across developed financial systems, the average growth rate in 
production efficiency for market-based economies (0.0008) is significantly larger than 
that for bank-based economies (-0.0004).  For financially developed countries, the  
average growth rate in production efficiency for bank-based economies (0.002) is 
significantly larger than that for market-based economies (-0.0008). 
These preliminary results are consistent with the view that the effectiveness of a 
given financial architecture depends on the contractual environment of the economy.  To 
further explore the patterns of relations that are emerging in the data, while controlling 
for potential country and industry heterogeneity that may derive the preliminary findings, 
we estimate an empirical model in which we attempt to explain cross country variation in 
growth in real value added based on variations in financial architecture.  We begin with a 
regression model in which we include country and industry characteristics explicitly to 
control for these potential country and industry heterogeneity.  Among the country 
characteristics, we include initial per capita GDP to control for the well-known William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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convergence effect.  As an industry characteristic, we include the output share of an 
industry to the total manufacturing output of the country to control for the relative 
importance of the industry in the country.   
In addition, we estimate a random-effects specification of the following form 
where, besides the explicit controls, the latent country-related and industry-related 
sources of variations on growth are effectively accounted for:  
ci i c ci
ci ci c c c ci c ci
e
where
FD FA FD Z FA G
+ + =
+ + + + + = ∑
η λ ε
ε δ φ γ β α
,
) * (
 
           
The model is a three-way error component specification with random country and 
industry effects to explicitly account for the cross-correlation between error terms for 
observations in the same country and the same industry respectively.  FA is either of the 
financial architecture variables: ARCHITECTURE, the conglomerate measure of the 
market-orientation of the financial system, or MARKET, the dummy variable that takes 1 
if the financial system is classified as market-oriented and 0 if not.  FD is indicator of 
financial development in a given country.  Specifically, we use the dummy variable 
UNDER, which takes the value 1 for financially underdeveloped systems to indicate 
financial development.  Z represents a host of explicit control variables.  In all the 
specifications, we include initial per capita GDP of countries to control for the impact of 
initial conditions on economic growth.  We also include the output share of an industry to 
the total manufacturing output of the country. λ , and η , are random country and industry 
effects intended to capture the latent country-related and industry-related sources of William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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variations on growth. The dependent variable, G, is the average annual growth rate in 
value added of industry i, in country c over the period 1980 through 1995. (Summary  
statistics for the variables is provided in Appendix I). We expect a positive relation 
between growth and financial architecture in financially developed economies and 
negative in financially underdeveloped ones.  
Table 4 presents the results of regressions across 10 industries in 36 countries 
around the world.  We use the dummy variable UNDER, which takes the value 1 for 
financially underdeveloped systems to indicate financial development.  This variable 
represents a proxy for the strength of the underlying contractual environment.  For 
measuring financial systems architecture, we use the dummy variable MARKET which 
takes 1 for market-based systems and, alternatively, the continuous variable 
ARCHITECTURE.  The focal variables for testing the hypotheses are the interaction 
variables: UNDER X MARKET and UNDER X ARCHITECTURE. 
From the OLS regressions, in column I, the coefficient on the interaction between 
UNDER and MARKET is negative and statistically significant, implying that, other 
things equal, market orientation of the financial system is inversely related to growth in 
real output in financially underdeveloped and hence contractually weak countries.  The 
MARKET variable enters with positive sign, implying a positive relation between market 
orientation and growth in financially developed countries, though this relation is 
somehow weaker than for financially underdeveloped countries.   Column II reports 
similar results based on the continuous variable ARCHITECTURE. The coefficient on 
the variable ARCHITECTURE is positive and highly statistically significant, implying 
that, among countries that are financially developed, market orientation of a financial William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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system is positively associated with growth.   The interaction variable between 
ARCHITECTURE and UNDER is negative and statistically significant at 1%  
significance level.  The absolute value of this coefficient (0.046) is very large in 
magnitude compared to the coefficient for ARCHITECTURE (0.017).   This implies that, 
other things equal, across countries that are financially underdeveloped, relatively 
market-based systems tend to achieve lower output growth. 
As would be expected, per Capita GDP has significant negative coefficients.  
Poorer countries grow faster, other things equal.  The magnitude of the implied rate of 
convergence is comparable to what is found in the growth literature.  Industry effects 
appear to be less important as the industry’s share in total manufacturing output has no 
relationship with industry growth.  
The random-effects specification provides similar results.  In column I, the 
interaction between UNDER and MARKET is negative and statistically significant, 
implying that, other things equal, across countries that are financially underdeveloped 
and hence with weaker contractual environments, industries grow faster in those 
countries with bank-based financial systems.  In column II, the coefficient for 
ARCHITECTURE is positive and significant, indicating that in financially developed 
countries, market orientation is positively related to industry growth.  This result is 
relatively weak.  On the other hand, the interaction term is negative and significant.  The 
magnitude of this coefficient is larger than the coefficient on ARCHITECTURE.  
Financial architecture, the relative market orientation of financial system, is inversely 
related to industry growth in financially underdeveloped economies. Increasing market-
orientation slows growth in financially underdeveloped and hence contractually weak William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
 
20
countries; yet it increases growth in financially developed and contractually strong 
countries.  For example, a one standard deviation (0.654) increase in ARCHITECTURE  
slows industry growth by an average rate of 1.7 % in financially underdeveloped 
economies while the same change in the variable increases industry growth in value 
added by about 1.2 % in financially developed, and hence contractually strong countries. 
Markets and banks provide vital financial services.  A growing literature 
documents the positive impact of these services on economic performance.  Levine and 
Zervos (1998) find that both bank development (measured by bank ratio) and stock 
market development (particularly in terms of market liquidity) positively impacts growth 
in per capita GDP.  Tadesse (2000) finds that stock market liquidity has a positive impact 
on measures of efficiency, productivity and growth in value added.   
For robustness, we would like to gauge the marginal impact of financial systems 
architecture, controlling for the effects of financial development.  Columns III and IV of 
Table 4 present the results of regressions in which we include market turnover ratio and 
bank credit ratio to control for capital market functions.   As would be expected, both 
turnover and bank ratio have positive and significant impacts on industry growth.   The 
variables have the same order of magnitude as found in the literature. More importantly, 
the impacts of financial architecture on growth are the same after controlling for turnover 
and bank-ratio.  From the random-effects estimations, the interaction of Market and 
Under (column III) and the interaction of Architecture and Under (column IV) are 
significantly negative, indicating inverse relations between market orientation and 
industry growth. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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  The evidence underscores bank-based systems as superior venues for financially 
underdeveloped economies and market-based systems as fitting financially developed 
economies.  The finding is consistent with Rajan and Zingales (1998b)’s conjuncture that  
market-based systems prosper in situations of strong contractual environment and bank-
based systems where such is lacking. The level of financial development of countries 
reflects the degree of contractability of the environment.  In an environment where the 
legal and institutional infrastructure is poor and hence lacks contract enforceability, 
investors rely on hierarchies and relationships as powers to prevent expropriation 
(solution to corporate governance), implying that institutions would be more effective 
and fitting than markets.  One would therefore expect bank-based (relationship based) 
systems to perform well in financially underdeveloped environments. 
 
B.  Financial Architecture, Firm Size and Economic Performance 
  The agency perspective to financial architecture as advanced in Boot and Thakor 
(1997) suggests that the relative merits of the bank-based and market based financial 
architectures depend on the informational environment of the economy.  Noting the 
comparative advantages of banks in monitoring post-lending moral hazard, and of 
markets in aggregating information for real decisions, they conjecture that bank based 
systems would fare better in economies where hidden action (moral hazard) problems 
predominate.  The greater the agency problem in the economy, the less incentive 
investors have to acquire information in the financial markets. As a result, the lower is 
the usefulness of market information in affecting real decisions, while the more valuable 
is bank monitoring in mitigating the prevalent moral hazard.  This implies that, other William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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things constant, a bank-based system might fit better to economies dominated by firms 
observationally more prone to agency problems.  
A gross indicator of the severity of agency problems across countries might be the 
dominance of small versus large firms in the given country.  While agency problems 
prevail across firm types, it can be argued that moral hazard is more severe among less-
reputed and less-transparent small firms.  One can then classify countries by the average 
size of a typical firm as indicator of whether a country is populated by less reputed small 
firms implying heightened problem of moral hazard.   
Table 5 presents a difference in means test of economic performance for countries 
classified by the size of the average (or typical) firm in the manufacturing sector.  We 
have data on the total number of firms and total real gross output in the manufacturing 
sector of each country.  Size of the average firm is calculated as total manufacturing-
sector gross output divided by total number of firms in the manufacturing sector.   The 
(log of) size of the average firm ranges from 7.68 in Jordan to 12.352 in Germany.  The 
size distribution appears to correlate with the level of development of countries.  Dividing 
the sample into two, small firm countries generally include emerging economies such as 
Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Peru and others; and large firm countries include 
such developed economies as Germany, Finland, Austria, Canada, the U.S and others.    
We categorize countries into quartiles by the size of the typical firm in each 
country.  Table 5 presents a comparison between countries in the bottom quartile and in 
the top quartile.  The results indicate that market based systems outperform bank based 
systems in economies dominated by large firms (i.e. the top quartile) and that bank-based 
systems outperform market based systems in countries dominated by small firms (i.e. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
 
23
bottom quartile).   The differences between the means of the corresponding performance 
measures are statistically significant.   Across countries that are the lowest quartile in  
firm-size, industries in bank-based systems register annual growth rate in value added of 
6.5% while those in market-based systems register a rate of –4.6 %.   In countries with 
the top firm-size quartile, those industries in market-base economies achieve annual 
growth rate of 3% while their counterparts in bank-based systems register a 0.8 %.  These 
preliminary results appear to support the agency perspective on financial architecture that 
market based systems might be valuable where information aggregation is important and 
bank based systems are valuable in conditions where ex post moral hazard is an important 
problem.    
Table 6 presents results of growth regressions where firm-size classification is a 
variable.  SIZE is a dummy variable that takes 1 if a country scores in the lower third in 
average manufacturing firm size ranking and 0 if it ranks in the top third.  MARKET is a 
dummy variable that takes 1 for market-based financial systems and 0 otherwise. 
ARCHITECTURE is a continuous variable denoting the relative market orientation of the 
financial system.  The focal variables of interest are the interaction between financial 
architecture and firm-size:  MARKET X SIZE and ARCHITECTURE X SIZE.   We 
expect the coefficients of the interaction terms to be significantly negative. 
Column I and column II report the results using the MARKET variable and the 
ARCHITECTURE variables respectively.  From the OLS results, the coefficient on the 
size variable is negative and significant, implying that countries dominated by smaller 
firms tend to grow slower. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and 
statistically significant at 1%.  The interpretation is that in countries that are dominated William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
 
24
by smaller firms, market-based financial systems retard growth (inversely bank-based 
systems promote growth).  This is also true in column II where we use the continuous  
ARCHITECTURE variable.  The interaction term is significantly negative implying that 
market-orientation is inversely related to growth in countries dominated by smaller firms.   
In column II, furthermore, the coefficient on SIZE is negative and significant, indicating 
that, other things constant, countries with small firms grow slower on average.  Similar 
results obtain in the random-effects specification.  In column I, the interaction MARKET 
X SIZE is negative and highly significant, indicating that market-based systems retard 
growth in countries dominated by smaller firms. The size variable has a negative 
coefficient, but is statistically not significant; hence, other things equal, being a country 
with predominantly small firms or predominantly large firms has no impact on growth.  
In column II, the interaction term has a significant negative coefficient, again indicating 
an inverse relation between market orientation and industry growth in countries with 
smaller firms.   Columns III and IV report results controlling for market turnover ratio 
and bank ratio as proxies for capital market functions. The evidence that market-
orientation adversely impacts industry growth in countries with small firms is robust both 
in the OLS and random-effects specifications.  The coefficients of the interaction terms 
are significantly negative.   
 To the extent that firm-size proxies for differences in the extent of agency 
problems, the results are consistent with the agency perspective to financial architecture 
in which bank-based systems are assumed to be fitting to economies with severe agency 
problems that require monitoring in which banks excel (Boot and Thakor (1997)).  In 
countries populated by smaller firms, where investment distortions due to moral hazard William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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tend to be endemic problem, bank monitoring becomes especially useful.  Moreover, in 
those circumstances where serious investment distortions prevail, investors lack the  
incentive to collect market information, rendering the comparative advantage of markets 
– i.e. market feedback (or information aggregation) function- ineffective.  
It should be noted, however, that it is difficult to empirically distinguish this 
agency perspective from the contractual view in which the effectiveness of a given 
architecture is assumed to depend on the strength of the contractual environment.  There 
is a partial endogeneity between firm size and financial development.   Kumar, Rajan and 
Zingales(1999) report that the strength of contractual environment is one of the key 
determinants of firm size.  In our sample, the size classification and the financial 
development classification have a correlation of 0.467.  Hence, an alternative 
interpretation of the evidence on firm size could be as a confirmation of the contractual 
view that the relative effectiveness of a financial architecture depends on the strength of 
the underlying contractual environment. For example, the evidence that countries with 
small firms fare better in bank-based architecture might suggest that bank-based systems 
complement weak contractual environment because low financial development, among 
others, tend to foster smaller firm size.  
 
C. Robustness 
In this subsection, we briefly describe the results of some of the robustness checks 
of our findings.  One major concern is the difficulty of classifying countries as market-
based or bank-oriented and whether the results are shaped by the particular classification 
scheme adopted in the paper.   In the analysis, we classified countries based on the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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means-removed average of the size, activity and efficiency measures of countries’ 
financial architecture.  For robustness, we generated a different ranking of countries  
based on the principal components of the size, activity and efficiency of financial 
architecture.  Levine (2000) uses this scheme.  In the new classification, Chile and 
Denmark qualify as market-based; and Belgium, Israel, and Jordan become bank-based.  
Furthermore, the continuous variable (ARCHITECTURE) takes new values.   We repeat 
the analysis using these new variables, and apply the random-effects version of our 
model.  The results are robust both in direction and magnitude.  In Table 7, in columns I, 
the interaction term between the architecture variable MARKET and UNDER is 
significantly negative and of the same order of magnitude.  Market-oriented financial 
systems retard growth (or conversely, bank-oriented systems promote growth) in 
financially underdeveloped economies.  The same is true in Column II where the 
interaction term between the continuous architecture variable – ARCHITECTURE – and 
the financial development variable – UNDER – is found to be significantly negative.  
Column III and IV report results on the impact of firm size using the new measures of 
financial architecture.  The coefficients of the interaction terms between SIZE and the 
financial architecture variables are negative and statistically significant, implying that 
market-oriented systems retard growth (and conversely, bank-oriented systems promote 
growth) in countries dominated by smaller firms. 
In the original regressions where we classify countries by typical firm size, we 
categorize countries into 3 size categories, and we compare the top and bottom third as 
large firm and small firm countries respectively.  This classification results in the U.K. 
and Japan in the middle category.  We include the two countries in the large category to William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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check for the sensitivity of the findings.  The results are in column VI and V.  The 
interaction variables are negative, statistically significant and are of similar  
magnitude.  To further check the sensitivity of the results to changes in the size 
classification scheme, we categorize the countries into size quartiles and compare the 
bottom and top quartiles as small versus large firm countries.  The results are not 
sensitive to such changes as can be seen under column VI and VII.  The coefficients are 
significant and are of comparable magnitude.  The findings that bank-based systems 
promote growth in countries of relatively small firms appear to be robust to variations in 
country classifications into size groupings as well to how we classify countries into bank 
based or market based financial architectures. 
  
V. Conclusion 
Countries differ in the way their financial sector is configured, ranging from the 
market-based systems typical of the Anglo-Saxon traditions to bank-centered systems 
characteristic of Continental Europe and Japan.   An important issue in corporate finance 
is the question of whether this diversity in financial system architecture has any 
consequence to economic performance in the real sector.  Does a financial architecture 
anchored on markets work better than one centered on banks, and if so, under what 
conditions?  
     Based on industry-level data from a panel of thirty-six countries, the paper 
examines how a country’s financial architecture affects performance in the real sector of 
the economy.   We argue that the relative effectiveness of a given architecture depends on  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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the level of development of the financial sector, the latter being a reflection of the 
supporting legal and institutional environment, and the prevalence and severity of agency 
problems in the economy.  
We find that financial architecture is not a matter of indifference in that real 
economic performance varies systematically across economies with differing financial  
system architecture. Across countries with developed financial sectors, industries 
supported by market-based financial systems grow faster than industries with bank-based 
systems.  Conversely, bank-based financial systems significantly outperform market-
based systems across countries with underdeveloped financial sectors.  Furthermore, we 
find that market-oriented systems retard economic growth and conversely, bank-oriented 
systems promote growth in countries dominated by smaller firms.  
     The evidence suggests that financial architecture, in and of itself, could be a 
source of value.  A lack of fit between the legal and institutional preconditions, and the 
financial architecture retards economic performance.   A market-oriented financial 
system does not fit well with an environment of weak contractability and lack of respect 
to the law. On the other hand, a synergic fit between the financial architecture and the 
contractual environment fosters economic growth.  In view of the evidence, recent 
directions in capital-market-development policy that prescribe market-oriented financial 
systems indiscriminately, particularly in emerging and transition economies might be  
misguided.  It suggests that in situations where the requisite legal and institutional 
preconditions are lacking, economies fare much better through strengthening their 
banking sector instead. 
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Table 2: Financial Architecture and Economic Performance 
 
Industry growth in real value added is the average annual compounded growth rate in  
real value added for each of the ten industries in each of the thirty-six countries over  
the period 1980 to 1995. Productivity and efficiency are computed based on parameter  
estimates of cross-country stochastic production and cost frontiers on the panel of  
industry production and cost data.  Production efficiency measures the degree to  
which an industry diverges from the efficient production frontier.  Economic efficiency 
measures the degree to which an industry diverges from the best practice cost frontier.  
Financial Architecture is a continuous variable that measures the degree of market  
orientation of a financial system and is an average of the means-removed values of size,  
activity and efficiency measures.  Market based dummy is a variable that takes 1 if the  
financial system is classified as market-based and 0 if it is bank-based.  Developed  
financial systems are countries with above average stock market liquidity and the ratio  
of bank credit to private sector to GDP. 
 
 Growth  in  Value 
Added 
Growth in 
Production 
Efficiency 
Growth in 
Economic 
Efficiency 
Growth in 
Productivity 
Financial  Structure      
    Bottom 25%  0.037  0.001  0.0005  0.016 
    Top 25%  0.039  0.001  0.0013  0.023 
      T-test 
 
-0.16 0.12 -0.46 -0.69 
Bank vs Market 
 
    
    Bank Based 
 
0.030 0.0004  0.0001 0.014 
    Market Based 
 
0.023 0.0001  -0.0001 0.018 
        T-test  0.98  0.61  0.19  -0.73 
Financial System 
Development 
 
    
    Developed 
 
0.037 0.0005  -0.0009 0.013 
    Underdeveloped 
 
0.020 0.0001  0.0007 0.017 
        T-test 
 
2.23
 b 0.59 -1.23 -0.52 
a  Significant at 1% ; 
b  Significant at 5%;  
c Significant at 10% 
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Table 3: Financial Architecture and Economic Performance: Summary 
 
Industry growth in real value added is the average annual compounded growth rate in real 
value added for each of the ten industries in each of the thirty-six countries over the 
period 1980 to 1995. Productivity and efficiency are computed based on parameter 
estimates of cross-country stochastic production and cost frontiers on the panel of 
industry production and cost data.  Production efficiency measures the degree to which an 
industry diverges from the efficient production frontier.  Economic efficiency measures 
the degree to which an industry diverges from the best practice cost frontier.  Financial 
Architecture is a continuous variable that measures the degree of market orientation of a 
financial system and is an average of the means-removed values of size, activity 
efficiency measures.  Market based dummy is a variable that takes 1 if the financial 
system is classified as market-based and 0 if it is bank-based.  Developed financial 
systems are countries with above average stock market liquidity and the ratio of bank 
credit to private sector to GDP. 
 
Performance 
Measures 
Overall 
Financial 
Development 
Bank –Based  Market-Based  T-test 
Developed 0.008  0.037  -4.93
 a 
Underdeveloped 0.063  0.005  4.12
 a 
 
Growth in Value 
Added 
   T- Test  -5.87
a  2.69
 a  
Developed -0.0004  0.0008  -2.72
 a 
Underdeveloped 0.0017  -0.0008  1.66
 c 
Growth in Production 
Efficiency 
T-Test -2.14
 b 1.40   
Developed 0.0003  0.014  -2.22
 b 
Underdeveloped -0.00004  -0.0019  0.91 
Growth in Economic 
Efficiency 
 
  T-Test 0.25  2.26
 b  
Developed 0.013  0.022  -1.91
 c 
Underdeveloped 0.014  0.012  0.14 
Growth in 
Productivity 
 
  T-Test -0.16  0.90   
a  Significant at 1% ; 
b  Significant at 5%;  
c Significant at 10% 
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Table 4: Financial Architecture, Financial Development and Economic 
Performance 
 
The dependent variable is average annual growth in real value added. The parameter 
estimates are maximum likelihood estimates of regression equations containing random 
country and industry effects. The OLS equations do not contain random effects. 
ARCHITECTURE is a continuous variable that measures the degree of market 
orientation of a financial system and is a means-removed average of the size, activity, 
efficiency dimensions of financial architecture. MARKET is a dummy variable that takes 
1 if the financial system is classified as market-based and 0 if it is bank-based.  UNDER 
is an indicator variable that takes 1 for countries classified as financially underdeveloped 
and 0 otherwise. Stock market turnover is total value of shares traded divided by market 
capitalization.  Bank credit ratio is claims of deposit money banks against the private 
sector divided by GDP.   All regressions also contain log of initial per capita income and 
industry share in manufacturing (not reported). Industry Share in Manufacturing is 
calculated by dividing the real output of the industry in the country by the total real 
output of the manufacturing sector of the country. Coefficients of the country and 
industry effects are not reported.  Asymptotic standard errors are given in parenthesis. 
 
OLS Random  Effects   
I II  III  IV I II  III  IV 
Intercept 
 
0.162
 a 
(0.044) 
0.174
 a 
(0.043) 
0.111
 b 
(0.044) 
0.140
 a 
(0.043) 
0.164
b 
(0.086) 
0.175
 b 
(0.084) 
0.124 
(0.085) 
0.150
 c 
(0.084) 
Under  
 
0.011 
(0.016) 
-0.015 
(0.012) 
0.049
 a 
(0.017) 
0.011 
(0.014) 
0.013 
(0.031) 
-0.011 
(0.025) 
0.043 
(0.033) 
0.008 
(0.028) 
Market   0.022
 c 
(0.010) 
 0.024
 b 
(0.010) 
 0.026 
(0.020) 
 0.027 
(0.019) 
 
Architecture   0.017
a 
(0.005) 
 0.014
 a 
(0.005) 
 0.018
 c 
(0.011) 
 0.016 
(0.011) 
Market X Under  -0.065
 a 
(0.016) 
 -0.073
 a 
(0.016) 
 -0.066
 b 
(0.033) 
 -0.072
 b 
(0.031) 
 
Architecture X 
Under 
 -0.046
 a 
(0.013) 
 -0.047
 a 
(0.018) 
 -0.044
 c 
(0.026) 
 -0.044
 c 
(0.025) 
Turnover     0.028
  
(0.020) 
0.031
  
(0.021) 
   0.019 
(0.034) 
0.020 
(0.037) 
Bank Ratio      0.094
 a 
(0.024) 
0.076
 a 
(0.023) 
   0.074
 c 
(0.044) 
0.056 
(0.045) 
Per Capita GDP  -0.016
a 
(0.004) 
-0.017
 a 
(0.004) 
-0.018
 a 
(0.004) 
-0.019
 a 
(0.004) 
-0.017
 b 
(0.017) 
-0.017
 b 
(0.009) 
-0.018
 b 
(0.008) 
-0.019
 b 
(0.009) 
Industry Share in 
Manufacturing 
0.035 
(0.089) 
0.043 
(0.089) 
0.050 
(0.086) 
0.053 
(0.087) 
0.060 
(0.072) 
0.060 
(0.072) 
0.060 
(0.073) 
0.060 
(0.073) 
a  Significant at 1% ; 
b  Significant at 5%;  
c Significant at 10% William Davidson Institute Working Paper 449 
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Table 5:  Financial Architecture, Firm Size and Economic Performance 
 
Industry growth rate in value added is average annual growth rate over 1980 through 
1995. Productivity and efficiency are computed based on parameter estimates of cross-
country stochastic production and cost frontiers on the panel of industry production and 
cost data.  Production efficiency measures the degree to which an industry diverges from 
the efficient production frontier.  Economic efficiency measures the degree to which an 
industry diverges from the best practice cost frontier. Architecture is a continuous 
variable that measures the degree of market orientation of a financial system and is a 
means-removed average of the size, activity, efficiency dimensions of financial 
architecture.  Firm size is total real output of the manufacturing sector of the country 
divided by the number of firms in the manufacturing sector. 
 
Performance 
Measures 
Country Ranking 
Based on Size of 
Average 
Manufacturing Firm 
Bank –Based  Market-
Based 
T-test 
Bottom 25%  0.065  -0.046  4.41
 a 
Top 25%  0.008  0.030  -2.19
 b 
 
Growth in Value 
Added 
   T- Test  5.42
a  -3.05
 a  
Bottom 25%  0.003  -0.003  2.15
 b 
Top 25%  -0.0003  0.0005  -1.14 
Growth in Production 
Efficiency 
T-Test 2.58
 b -1.42   
Bottom 25%  0.002  -0.005  2.01
b 
Top 25%  0.0003  0.0002  0.10 
Growth in Economic 
Efficiency 
 
  T-Test 1.27  -1.94
 c  
Bottom 25%  0.022  -0.0005  0.93 
Top 25%  0.015  0.020  -0.54 
Growth in 
Productivity 
 
  T-Test 0.74  -0.85   
a  Significant at 1% ; 
b  Significant at 5%;  
c Significant at 10% 
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Table 6: Financial Architecture, Firm Size, and Economic Performance 
 
The dependent variable is average annual growth in value added over 1980-1995. The 
parameter estimates are maximum likelihood estimates of regression equations 
containing random country and industry effects. The OLS equations do not contain 
random effects. ARCHITECTURE is a continuous variable that measures the degree of 
market orientation of a financial system and is a means-removed average of the size, 
activity, efficiency dimensions of financial architecture. MARKET is a dummy variable 
that takes 1 if the financial system is classified as market-based and 0 if it is bank-based.  
UNDER is an indicator variable that takes 1 for countries classified as financially 
underdeveloped and 0 otherwise.  SIZE is an indicator variable that takes 1 for countries 
with smaller average manufacturing firm size and 0 otherwise.  Stock market turnover is 
total value of shares traded divided by market capitalization.  Bank credit ratio is claims 
of deposit money banks against the private sector divided by GDP.   All regressions also 
contain log of initial per capita income and industry share in manufacturing (not 
reported). Industry Share in Manufacturing is calculated by dividing the real output of the 
industry in the country by the total real output of the manufacturing sector of the country. 
Coefficients of the country and industry effects are not reported.  Asymptotic standard 
errors are given in parenthesis. 
 
OLS Random  Effects   
I  II III IV  I  II III IV 
Intercept 
 
0.313
a 
(0.047) 
0.271
a 
(0.046) 
0.323
 a 
(0.050) 
0.289
 a 
(0.047) 
0.295
a 
(0.079) 
0.255
b 
(0.086) 
0.302
 a 
(0.085) 
0.262
 a 
(0.079) 
Size  
 
-0.030
c 
(0.016) 
-0.057
 a 
(0.015) 
-0.026 
(0.018) 
-0.046
 a 
(0.015) 
-0.026 
(0.029) 
-0.054
 c 
(0.028) 
-0.024 
(0.032) 
-0.046 
(0.029) 
Market   -0.013 
(0.014) 
 -0.010
  
(0.014) 
 -0.011 
(0.038) 
 -0.008
  
(0.025) 
 
Architecture   -0.001 
(0.011) 
 0.004 
(0.011)
  
 0.001 
(0.021) 
 0.005 
(0.021)
  
Market X 
Size 
-0.106
 a 
(0.021) 
 -0.101
a 
(0.021) 
 -0.108
 a 
(0.038) 
 -0.105
a 
(0.039) 
 
Architecture 
X Size 
 -0.086
 a 
(0.021) 
 -0.088
 a 
(0.020) 
 -0.096
 b 
(0.041) 
 -0.099
 b 
(0.041) 
Turnover    0.004 
(0.030) 
0.021 
(0.032) 
   0.008 
(0.049) 
0.009 
(0.053) 
Bank  Ratio    0.063
 b 
(0.026) 
0.091
 a 
(0.028) 
   0.036 
(0.046) 
0.058 
(0.051) 
Per Capita 
GDP 
-0.031
 a 
(0.005) 
-0.027
 a 
(0.005) 
-0.036
 a 
(0.005) 
-0.035
 a 
(0.005) 
-0.029
 a 
(0.008) 
-0.026
 a 
(0.009) 
-0.032
 a 
(0.009) 
-0.030
a 
(0.009) 
Industry Share 
Manufacturing 
0.067 
(0.109) 
0.074 
(0.117) 
0.079 
(0.108) 
0.085 
(0.114) 
0.095 
(0.114) 
0.103 
(0.114) 
0.094 
(0.114) 
0.099 
(0.114) 
a  Significant at 1% ; 
b Significant at 5%;  
c Significant at 10% W
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Appendix I:  Summary Statistics 
 
UNDER is an indicator variable that takes 1 for countries classified as financially underdeveloped and 0 
otherwise.  MARKET is a dummy variable that takes 1 if the financial system is classified as market-based 
and 0 if it is bank-based.  ARCHITECTURE is a continuous variable that measures the degree of market 
orientation of a financial system and is a means-removed average of the size, activity, efficiency 
dimensions of financial architecture. Average Firm size is calculated as total real output of the 
manufacturing sector of the country divided by the number of firms in the manufacturing sector. SIZE is an 
indicator variable that takes 1 for countries with smaller average manufacturing firm size and 0 otherwise.  
Stock market turnover is total value of shares traded divided by market capitalization.  Bank credit ratio is 
claims of deposit money banks against the private sector divided by GDP. Industry Share in Manufacturing 
is calculated by dividing the real output of the industry in the country by the total real output of the 
manufacturing sector of the country. Industry growth rate in value added is average annual growth rate over 
1980 through 1995.  
  Variables 
N Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
UNDER   281  0.352  0.479  0  1 
MARKET 281  0.399  0.490  0  1 
ARCHITECTURE 281  0.059  0.654  -0.820  1.960 
Log of Average Firm 
Size 
281 10.806  0.883  7.680 12.352 
SIZE 206  0.252  0.435  0  1 
Stock Market Turnover 
Ratio 
277  0.270 0.197 0.010  0.897 
Bank  Ratio  280  0.469 0.241 0.102  1.046 
Log Per Capita GDP  281  8.833  1.355  5.780  10.179 
Share of Industry’s  
Value Added to Total 
Manufacturing 
280  0.053 0.047 0.004  0.238 
Growth in Real Value 
Added 
251 0.020  0.047  -0.268 0.200 
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